This brief was submitted by MiningWatch Canada to the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence, for their study on the nexus between national defence, national security, and Canada’s critical minerals sector.
Executive Summary
As international institutions erode and “middle powers” like Canada find themselves on the front lines between three imperial powers – the United States, Russia and China – several voices are calling for Canada to exercise greater control over its mineral resources to protect national security and sovereignty. At their most extreme, these fears raise the possibility that foreign states could use so-called critical minerals for economic, industrial or military purposes in a manner hostile to Canada’s security and sovereignty.
At the turn of the decade, the Quebec government established the first plan concerning so-called critical minerals. Since then, the Government of Canada and other provincial governments have adopted their own critical mineral strategies and lists. While these plans and strategies each vary slightly, they share a common premise: minerals are considered “critical” primarily because of the purely economic issue of their role in global supply chains. Contrary to what industry and government promotional and advertising campaigns have been trying to impress upon people since the early 2020s, it is certainly not necessary for these mineral substances to be used for the energy transition in order for them to be designated as “critical”.
At the constitutional level, the Government of Canada is expected to collaborate with provincial governments on the issue of the nexus between so-called critical minerals, national defence and national security. In our view, the most effective way to control access to minerals begins at the earliest stages of the mining cycle. However, despite the “security” threat that many provincial governments have been raising for several years now regarding the participation of hostile foreign states in the mining sector under their jurisdiction, we see virtually nothing in the recent bills introduced by these governments that would allow them to gain better control over their mineral resources.
At the moment, the Government of Canada and provincial governments seem more concerned about deterring foreign investors or erecting trade barriers than they are about seeing foreign states turn minerals extracted from Canadian soil against us.
Without classified information on this subject, we do not believe it is the role of an organisation such as ours to comment on the actual risk of aggression against Canada by the United States, China or any other foreign entity, whether or not they use so-called critical minerals from Canadian soil.
However, the idea that there may be an imminent threat or hostile takeover of Canada’s mineral resources by a foreign state is diminished by the level of cooperation shown by the Government of Canada with the United States government, including the Department of War, in the joint development of numerous mining projects deemed critical or of national importance, and by the diplomatic rapprochement between the Government of Canada and China.
For the sake of consistency, the Government of Canada — and the provincial and territorial governments — should adopt a more transparent approach and clearly communicate to the public whether it intends to tolerate, accept or refuse foreign state access to and control over Canada’s critical minerals within global supply chains. These positions should then be reflected in policy by limiting cooperation with, and restricting access for, foreign entities that are hostile to Canada’s security.
One thing is certain: further damage to the environment and to the rights of Indigenous peoples and local communities is to be expected if Canada pushes for increased mining production for military, national security, or national defence purposes. It is inconceivable that the impacts of mining will be reduced in a context of mining industry expansion. Although we strongly doubt that there is a technologically feasible way to do this, it is imperative that the Government of Canada demonstrate how its defence policies and action plans related to critical minerals are compatible with a reduction in its greenhouse gas emissions and that real action is taken to limit the environmental impacts of the extraction and use of so-called critical minerals.
Along with a large segment of civil society, we denounce the diversion of funds, resources and efforts needed for the energy transition in the name of national security. In our view, the only way to meet mineral production targets for all sectors, including the energy transition, national defence and national security, is to aim instead for mineral sobriety, i.e., to reduce Canada’s overall overconsumption of critical minerals. The climate emergency is a real and present danger to national security, not just a vague geopolitical threat. We cannot negotiate peace with a warming climate.
Under no circumstances should Canada’s mineral resources be used as weapons of aggression or genocide. The Government of Canada must make firm commitments in this regard and establish a transparent and credible system for tracking its critical minerals.
The bills introduced by the Government of Canada and the provinces should not allow for the fast-tracking of permits to mining companies or foreign entities that are hostile to Canada’s national security. There is every reason to fear that political pressure to fast-track permits to mining companies, combined with increased demand for minerals for national defence and energy transition sectors, will open the door to authorizing mining projects that are harmful and dangerous to the safety of workers, local communities, the climate and the environment. The Government of Canada must also take a clear and firm position that the country’s military supply chains cannot rely on seabed mining.
We emphasize the crucial importance that Canada must not rely on uranium mining nor the use of nuclear energy, for national defence, national security, energy transition or any other purpose. It is impossible to separate uranium mining for the nuclear energy sector from that used in the nuclear weapons sector. We believe that the claim that uranium mining and the use of nuclear energy could contribute to energy security is misleading. On the contrary, this approach would increase our exposure to risks and threats that undermine our national security.
Both domestically and internationally, the Government of Canada and many provincial governments, assert that Canadian jurisdictions stand apart from other mining jurisdictions around the world in their ability to produce not only “critical” minerals, but also “responsible” minerals. We do not share this view. Before daring to make such a claim, the Canadian and provincial governments should enshrine the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in mining legislation so that free, prior and informed consent is mandatory before any mining licence is issued.
In the same spirit, we invite the Standing Committee on National Defence to recognize that safeguarding clean water and air is vital to Canada, its national defence and its national security.
To ensure national security and the maintenance of supply chains, the Government of Canada and provincial governments should focus their efforts on achieving mineral sobriety across all minerals and sectors, including the national defence sector.
The reuse and recycling of critical minerals must be prioritized in government investments, provided that these measures do not jeopardise public health and the environment.
Read the full brief here.